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In tlte StipreDie Cotirt of the 
State of Utah 
FLORENCE BUCKLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STANLEY COX and ALICE T. C'OX, 
his wife, and KARL COX, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7730 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
The brief of respondent seems to be based on the theory 
that if there is evidence in the record from which the court 
might find for the plaintiff, the judgment can be sustained. 
The appellants concede that if the testimony of plaintiff can 
be disregarded that there is evidence to sustain · the judg-
ment of the trial court. The question is - ·CAN THE 
COURT DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF, 
WHEN SHE ADMITS ALL THE NECESSARY ELE-
MENTS OF ADVERSE USER IN THE DEF1ENDANTS, 
AND GRANT JUDG~.1:ENT IN I-IER FAVOR? 
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FURTHER STATEMENT 
The plaintiff, in addition to what is quoted in the orig-
inal brief of appellants, testified to the following: 
"'Over the years since the Coxes have been there 
do you know of any use they made of the driveway, 
other than to bring in coal and a few things? 
A. No, I don't." (Tr. p. 161) 
"And at that time this question, on page 15, was 
asked: 'Q. But more so the last two years. 
A. He has taken it over the last two years, it 
doesn't belong to us any more. 
Q. But before that he used it? 
A. He used it whenever he wanted, we didn't say 
anything to him.'" (Tr. p. 162) 
Again on page 163 appears the following: 
"Q. At:Jd on page 16 you answered to a question 
as follows: 
'Yes, of course after Mr. Cox got his road on the 
north then I thought that would relieve us, he wouldn't 
have to have two roads into his place, you know. 
Q. But he continued even after that? 
A. Yes, he continued to use it. 
Q. And claimed the right to use it? 
A. And claimed the right to use it.--(Balance 
stricken)' 
Q. Did you so testify? 
A. I did." 
It might also be mentioned that Mr. Ernest F. Buckley 
testified as follows on direct examination for plaintiff: 
''Do you remember when this trouble began? 
A. Well it began here abqut, oh, couple of years 
ago I guess when this young Cox got his car, and when 
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he drove my sister's roomers out of there and told them 
to get out of the driveway. 
Q. Before that time had there ever been any trou-
ble with the Coxes about what little use they made of 
the driveway? 
A. They never had any trouble because they 
never used the road any more than just probably to 
get back and forth. But I don't ever remember them 
using the road to haul any of that stuff up in there that 
they claim." (Tr. p. 152) 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's own testimony established adverse user by 
appellants. 
The appellants believe that the great preponderance of 
the testimony is that the use they have made of the drive-
way was open and notorious, but that it is not necessary to 
prove that to bring the claim of adverse right to the atten-
tion of plaintiff. Plaintiff's own testimony conclusively 
proves that she had actual notice of the adverse claim of 
appellants and of their use of the driveway, and with such 
knowledge she consented to the use of the driveway for 
more than 20 years without objection. Plaintiff testified 
that she had asked Cox many times not to use the drive-
way, but he claimed the right to use it at all times since he 
came there in 1927 like it was his road, and like she didn't 
have any claim to it at all. (Tr. 26-28) She was asked: 
"Q. You testified on your deposition that Mr. Cox had al-
ways claimed the right to use of the driveway since he had 
been there? A. Yes, he has." (Tr. 30) 
The purpose of open and notorious possession is to give 
notice to the owner. The case of Downie vs. City of Ren-
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ton, 162 Wash. '181, 9 P(2) 372, at page 374 of the Pacific 
Report, states it as follows: 
tion: 
"-·-To ·acquire an easement by prescription the 
owner must know of and acquiesce in the adverse user, 
or the use must be so open, notorious, visible and un-
interrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be 
presumed.'' 
Later on the same page appears the following quota-
"The words 'open and notorious possession,' asap-
plied to the adverse holding of land by· another, mean 
that the disseisor's claim of ownership must be evi-
denced by such acts and conduct as are sufficient to 
put a man of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact 
that the land in question is held by the claimant as his 
own * * * It is, therefore, essential in all cases 
that the owner shall have notice to that effect. If he 
has actual notice that will, of course, be sufficient in 
itself. Where, however, there has been no actual notice, 
. it is necessary to show that the possession of the dis-
seisor was so open, notorious, and visible, as to war-
rant the inference that the owner must, or should, have 
known it; othewise a mere trespass might be evidence 
of ouster.' 1 R. C. L. 14, pp. 700,701." 
Appellants have no contention with the law submitted 
in the brief of respondent, but it simply does no add up to 
a- judgment for the plaintiff. Here we have the plaintiff 
herself admitting all the essential elements of adverse use 
and this is the substance of her testimony and not mere 
parts of it. She never did deny the essential parts, and no 
one could make that denial for her It is respectfully sub-
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mited that on the record appellants are entitled to judg-
ment. 
Respectfully submited, 
J. C. HALBERSLEBEN, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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